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CHAPTER 9 
Conflict of Laws 
FRANCIS ]. NICHOLSON, S.]. 
§9.1. Construction of federal change of venue statute: Transferee 
district required to apply state law of transferor district. In Van 
Dusen v. Barrack l the United States Supreme Court held that wrong-
ful death actions begun in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania could be transferred to the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts under the 
federal change of venue statute, and that the federal court in Massa-
chusetts, in the event of such a transfer, must apply applicable 
Pennsylvania state law including its conflict of laws rules. 
The case arose from the crash of a commercial airliner into Boston 
Harbor on October 4, 1960. Over 150 suits for wrongful death and 
personal injury were brought against the airline and several manu-
facturers as a result of the accident, more than one hundred of them 
in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
and more than forty-five in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
The plaintiffs in the present case were Pennsylvania fiduciaries 
representing the estates of Pennsylvania decedents killed in the crash. 
The defendants moved under Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code 
of 19482 to transfer the plaintiffs' wrongful death actions from the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania to the District of Massachusetts 
where, allegedly, most <?,.f, the witnesses lived and where the other 
actions were pending. The district court granted the motion, holding 
that the transfer was justified irrespective of whether the transferred 
actions would be governed by the laws and choice of law rules of 
Pennsylvania or of Massachusetts.3 The district court also specifically 
held that transfer was not precluded by the fact that the plaintiffs 
had not qualified to sue as representatives of the decedents under 
Massachusetts law. The plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus from 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to restrain 
FMNCIS J. NICHOLSON, S.J. is Assistant Professor of Law at Boston College Law 
School and a member of the District of Columbia and Massachusetts Bars. 
§9.1. 11176 U.S. 612, 84 Sup. Ct. 805, 11 L. Ed. 2d 945 (1964). 
228 U.S.C. §1404(a) (1958). In permitting a change of venue within the federal 
judicial system, §l404(a) provides that: "For the convenience of parties and wit-
nesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to 
any other district or division where it might have been brought." 
3 Popkin v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Pa. 1962). 
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§9.1 CONFLICT OF LAWS 81 
the transfer. The court of appeals ruled that a Section 1404(a) 
transfer could be granted only if, at the time the suits were brought, 
the plaintiffs had qualified to sue in Massachusetts. Section 1404(a) 
restricts transfers to those federal districts in which the action "might 
have been brought." Since the plaintiffs had not obtained ancillary 
appointment in Massachusetts when their suits were brought in 
Pennsylvania, they were unable to initiate their actions in Massa-
chusetts. Therefore, the appellate court concluded that Massachusetts 
was not a permissible forum under the "might have been brought" 
limitation and directed the district court to vacate its order of 
transfer.4 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari5 and, in an 
opinion by Mr. Justice Goldberg for a unanimous Court, held that the 
judgment of the court of appeals must be reversed, that both the 
court of appeals and the district court had erred in their assumptions 
regarding the state law to be applied to a Section 1404(a) transfer, 
and that, accordingly, the case must be remanded to the district 
court. 
With regard to the issue as to where the action "might have been 
brought," the Court pointed out that the purpose of Section 1404(a) 
was to allow transfers of suits from one federal district to another 
for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of 
justice.6 The Court said that it could not agree that the "might 
have been brought" clause was intended to limit the availability of 
convenient federal forums by referring to state-law rules such as those 
concerning capacity to sue. The court of appeals' decision, the Court 
continued, would give personal representatives bringing wrongful 
death actions the power unilaterally to reduce the number of per-
missible federal forums merely by refraining from qualifying as 
representatives in states other than the one in which they wished to 
bring suit. Accordingly, the Court held that the words "where it 
might have been brought" must be construed with reference to the 
federal laws of venue and jurisdiction and not with reference to 
laws of the transferee state concerning the capacity of fiduciaries to 
sue.7 
The next question that faced the Court was whether a change of 
venue within the federal system was to be accompanied by a change 
in the applicable state law. The district court had held that a 
transfer could be ordered irrespective of whether the transferred 
actions would be governed by the laws and choice of law rules of 
Pennsylvania or of Massachusetts. The Massachusetts Death Act 
4 Barrack v. Van Dusen, 309 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1962). 
II 1172 U.S. 964. B1I Sup. Ct. lOBB. 10 L. Ed. 2d 12B (1963). 
61176 U.S. 612, 616. B4 Sup. Ct. B05. B09. 11 LEd. 2d 945. 949-950 (1964). 
7Id. at 621-624, 54 Sup. Ct. at BI2-B13. 11 L. Ed. 2d at 953-954. As the Court 
had already noted, there was no question concerning the propriety either of venue 
or of jurisdiction in the District of Massachusetts. the proposed transferee forum. 
Id. at 617. B4 Sup. Ct. at B09. 11 L. Ed. 2d at 950. 
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based the recovery of damages upon the degree of the tort-feasor's 
culpability with a $20,000 limit.8 The Pennsylvania Act followed 
the compensation principle without any limitation as to the amount 
of damages.9 The plaintiffs contended, therefore, that the change 
to the Massachusetts district, with the likelihood of a change to 
Massachusetts state law prejudicial to the plaintiffs, was precluded 
by the "interest of justice" clause of Section 1404(a). 
The Court disagreed with the district court's assumption that a 
transfer would be permissible even if accompanied by a significant 
change of law and stated that the decisions of the lower federal courts 
construing Section 1404 (a) had protected plaintiffs against a pre-
judicial change in state laws through transfer. The Court, specifically 
endorsing the view adopted in Headrick v. Atchison, T. &- S. F. Ry.l0 
and further developed in H. L. Green Co. v. Mac1\1ahon,11 held that 
in cases in which the defendants seek transfer, the transferee district 
court must apply the state law that would have been applied if 
there had been no change of venue. This meant, in the present 
case, that the federal district court in Massachusetts would be re-
quired to apply Pennsylvania state law, including its choice of law 
rules, to the wrongful death actions. It also meant that the plaintiffs' 
capacity to sue would also be governed by the laws of Pennsylvania.12 
The final question dealt with by the Court was whether the pro-
posed transfer could be justified on the grounds of convenience and 
fairness. The district court, in its opinion, had assumed that transfer 
to Massachusetts would facilitate the consolidation of these cases 
with those pending in the District of Massachusetts. Since, however, 
Pennsylvania law would govern the trial of the transferred cases, 
insofar as this law might be different from the law governing the 
cases already pending in Massachusetts, consolidation might . no 
longer be feasible. IS Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to 
the district court so that the motion to transfer could be reconsidered 
in the light of all the factors bearing upon the desirability of transfer.14 
8 The Massachusetts statute has since been amended to raise the upper limit 
of recovery to $30,000. G.L., c. 229, §2. 
912 Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann. §§1601·1604 (1953). 
10182 F.2d 305 (lOth Cir. 1950). 
11 312 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963). 
12376 U.S. 612, 629·643, 84 Sup. Ct. 805, 816-823, II L. Ed. 2d 945, 957-965 (1964). 
18 Such might be the result, the Court noted, if Pennsylvania law did not subject 
the transferred suits to the Massachusetts culpability and damage limitation pro-
visions. In this situation the plaintiffs might be dependent upon compensatory 
damage witnesses more conveniently located for trial in Pennsylvania. 
In a decision rendered after the present case, Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 
416 Pa. 3, 203 A.2d 796 (1964), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court abandoned the 
strict lex loci delicti rule in order to apply Pennsylvania law to the issue of 
damages in an action brought on behalf of the estate of a Pennsylvania decedent 
who died in a Colorado plane crash. The court, noting that the estate could 
recover little under Colorado law but might recover a substantial amount under 
Pennsylvania law, held that Pennsylvania, the domicile of the decedent and his 
family, had a greater interest in the amount of recovery than had Colorado. 
14 376 U.S. 612, 643-646, 84 Sup. Ct. 805, 823-824, II L. Ed. 2d 945, 965-967 
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The present decision brings welcome added precision to the inter-
pretation of Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code. More specifically, 
it removes some of the confusion remaining after the Court's decision 
in Hoffman v. Blaski.15 In Hoffman the Court denied transfer, ruling 
that the action might not have been brought in the transferee 
district because at the time the complaint was filed in the transferor 
court the transferee forum lacked both venue of the action and power 
to command jurisdiction over the defendants. Mr. Justice Goldberg 
distinguished Hoffman, stating that in Van Dusen both venue and 
jurisdiction were proper in Massachusetts. The critical issue, as the 
Court saw it, was whether the limiting words of Section 1404(a) 
refer not only to federal venue statutes but also to state laws that 
might further restrict the availability of convenient federal forums. 
The Court refused to extend the Hoffman decision by concluding 
that the limiting clause of Section 1404(a) makes no such reference 
to state law. This result seems proper in view of the federal policy 
of facilitating litigation in convenient federal courts. 
It is interesting to note, too, that the present decision is in accord 
with the accepted interpretation of the increasingly important forum 
non conveniens rule. The Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second 
acknowledges that the plaintiff ordinarily controls choice of forum, 
and that his choice of the place of suit is not to be disturbed unless 
it is seriously inappropriate and an alternative forum is available.16 
It is submitted that the Court's holding that the transferee district 
must apply the state law of the transferor district accords to the 
plaintiffs the advantages accruing to them under the forum non 
conveniens doctrine. 
It should be observed, finally, that the Court's ruling that the 
transferee court should apply the law of the transferor forum is 
not an absolute norm for all situations. Such an interpretation of 
the Court's holding would, obviously, encourage the abuse of forum 
shopping. The Court was aware of the necessity of placing limita-
tions upon its ruling. when it stated the following: 
In so ruling, however, we do not and need not consider whether 
in all cases §1404(a) would require the application of the law of 
the transferor, as opposed to the transferee, State. We do not 
attempt to determine whether, for example, the same considera-
tions would govern if a plaintiff sought transfer under §1404(a) 
or if it was contended that the transferor State would simply 
have dismissed the action on the ground of forum non con-
veniens.17 
(1964). Mr. Justice Black noted that he concurred in the reversal but he believed 
that, under the circumstances shown in the opinion. ,the Court should now hold 
it was error to order the actions transferred to the District of Massachusetts. 
15868 U.S. 885, 80 Sup. Ct. 1084. 4 L. Ed. 2d 1254 (1960). 
·18 Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second §117e, Comment c (Tent. Draft No.4, 
1957). 
17 376 U.S. 612. 639·640, 84 Sup. Ct. 805, 821, 11 L. Ed. 2d 945, 963 (1964). 
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The fact that the decision to grant or deny a motion to transfer is 
discretionary with the district judge18 should, in any case, obviate 
the danger of misuse of the federal change of venue statute. 
§9.2. Minority stockholder's derivative suit: Federal Investment 
Company Act of 1940 and choice of law rule. In Levitt v. Johnson1 
the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
applied Massachusetts law in dismissing a stockholder's derivative suit 
brought on behalf of a Massachusetts corporation and based upon 
a federal statute. 
The plaintiff stockholder, at the time when the complaint was 
filed, was executor for the estate of an owner of stock in the Massa-
chusetts corporation, letters testamentary having been issued to him 
by an Illinois probate court. He had not, at this time, been appointed 
ancillary administrator by a Massachusetts probate court. 
The plaintiff claimed that the directors of the corporation and 
outside investment advisers had injured the corporation by violations 
of the federal Investment Company Act of 194()2 and by waste of 
corporate assets. Most of the claimed violations and waste were 
related to allegedly excessive advisory fees which, according to the 
complaint, constituted embezzlement in violation of Section 37 of 
the federal act.s The complaint stated that it would have been 
futile for the plaintiff to make demand upon the corporate directors 
because they were among the alleged wrongdoers. The plaintiff 
also claimed that a demand upon the other stockholders to bring 
action was unnecessary and would be futile.4 
The plaintiff thereupon requested the court to declare the advisory 
fee contracts void and to order the defendants to repay all fees to 
the corporation. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint 
on the grounds, inter alia, that it failed to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted. The federal district court dismissed the 
complaint for failure to state a cause of action because of the failure 
of the plaintiff to plead that he had complied with Massachusetts 
law as to prior demand upon the other shareholders in the corpora-
tion before instituting the derivative suit. The court held that 
this Massachusetts rule had to be complied with even though the 
plaintiff's claim was based upon a federal statute. 
18 See Trader v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Pa. 1961). 
§9.2. 1222 F. Supp. 805 (D. Mass. 1963). 
215 U.S.C. §§80a-l to 80a-52 (1958). 
315 U.S.C. §80a-36 (1958) states in part as follows: "Whoever steals, unlawfully 
abstracts, unlawfully and willfully -converts to his own use or to ,the use of another, 
or embezzles any of the moneys, funds, securities, credits, property, or assets of 
any registered investment company shall be deemed guilty of a crime." 
4 The reasons given for t:he asserted futility included: the transactions complained 
of were illegal and therefore incapable of ratification by a majority of the stock· 
holders; under the charter and by·laws of the corporation the shareholders could 
not require the directors to bring suit; and a demand upon more than 48,000 
stockholders would place an unreasonable financial burden upon the plaintiff. 
5
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The court found that it had jurisdiction of the action.1! It also 
ruled that the plaintiff executor had capacity to bring the derivative 
suit although he had not been appointed ancillary administrator 
in Massachusetts when he filed the complaint. The law recognizes 
that an executor may bring suit in a personal rather than representa-
tive capacity outside the state of his appointment when the cause 
of action in behalf of the estate arises out of transactions occurring 
after the death of the decedent.6 Since the plaintiff held legal title 
to shares in the corporation after his appointment as executor by 
the Illinois probate court, and since some of the wrongs allegedly 
occurred during the period of his executorship, the court correctly 
held that he had the right to bring an action for an injury to the 
corporation during the time he was legal owner, even though the 
ownership was for the benefit of others. 
The principal problems in the case were what law governs the 
right of a shareholder to maintain a derivative suit and whether the 
plaintiff executor had fulfilled the essential conditions of that govern-
ing law.7 
The usual conflict of laws rule is that the local law of the state of 
incorporation determines the right of a shareholder to participate 
in the administration of the affairs of the corporation and to act as 
its representative in pursuing a claim.8 The court, consistent with 
this well-established principle, held that the local law of Massa-
chusetts, the state of incorporation, controlled the right of the 
plaintiff to maintain his derivative suit.9 
Under Massachusetts law a minority shareholder cannot bring a 
derivative suit to enforce a claim that a majority of his fellow share-
holders have determined in good faith not to present, even though 
the alleged wrong is not ratifiable.10 Because of this rule of Massa-
/I Section 44 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 expressly vests the federal 
district courts with jurisdiction of "violations of this subchapter or the rules, regu-
lations, or orders thereunder." 15 U.S.C. §80a-43 (1958). 
6 Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 363-364 (4th ed., Scoles, 1964); Restatement of Con-
flict of Laws §508 (1934)_ The foreign executor, in the absence of a statute per-
mitting it, cannot bring suit on a cause of action belonging to the decedent. Re-
statement of Conflict of Laws §507 (1934). 
7 The court found that the complaint had fulfilled the procedural requirements 
of Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in that it set out in detail 
the reasons why the plaintiff did not attempt to obtain action from the share-
holders. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) reads in relevant part as follows: "In an action 
brought to enforce a secondary right on the part of one or more shareholders . . . 
the complaint shall . . . set forth with particularity the efforts of the plain tiff 
to secure from the managing directors or trustees and, if necessary, from the 
shareholders such action as he desires, and the reasons for his failure to obtain 
such action or the reasons for not making such effort." 
8 Restatement of Confliot of Laws Second §183 (Tent. Draft No.7, 1962); Hausman 
v. Buckley, 299 F.2d 696, 702 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962). 
9222 F. Supp. 805, 808 (D. Mass. 1963). 
10 Solomont Be Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England Theatres Operating Corp., 326 
Mass. 99,93 N.E.2d 241 (1950). With respect to the requirement of demand upon 
fellow stockholders, the so-called Massachusetts rule expressed in the Solomont case 
6
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chusetts law, the court stated that a 'shareholder in a Massachusetts 
corporation must make demand upon the other stockholders before 
he brings a derivative suit. Only an allegation that the majority 
are corrupt or are otherwise incapable of acting in good faith excuses 
the demand. Since the plaintiff failed to plead compliance with 
the strict Massachusetts rule as to prior demand, the court dismissed 
the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.11 
The court's determination to apply the conventional conflicts rule 
respecting the plaintiff's right to bring his derivative action posed 
another and more difficult choice of law problem for the tribunal. 
This was not a diversity jurisdiction case in which the federal district 
court would be required, under the Erie rule, to apply Massachusetts 
law, including its conflicts law.12 The action was based upon the 
federal Investment Company Act of 1940, and the court took jurisdic-
tion under Section 44 of that statute.1S The plaintiff in bringing 
his derivative suit was prosecuting a federally created right. The 
question presented itself, therefore, as to whether the court reached 
the right decision in permitting state law to cut off the enforcement 
of that federal right. 
It is clear that a federal court must apply federal law to a federal 
issue and state law to a state issue, irrespective of the basis of the 
jurisdiction.a The correct choice of law requires, therefore, that 
a court determine whether the interest in question is federal or 
state. The court in the present case determined that the plaintiff's 
right to bring a derivative action for his corporation was essentially 
a matter relating to the internal management of the corporation. It 
was, therefore, a state interest to be governed by the law of Massa-
chusetts, the state of incorporation, even though the claim of wrong-
doing was based upon a federal statute.11i 
The court was certainly cognizant of the federal interest issue, for 
it stated that the situation would be different if the federal statute 
had provided the stockholder with a direct right against those who 
damaged the corporation in violation of a national regulatory policy 
is a minority position and has been criticized. See Note, Demand on Directors and 
Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 711 Harv. L. Rev. 746, 747, 762 
(1960). 
11222 F. Supp. 805, 810·812 (D. Mass. 19611). 
12 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 1104 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (19118); 
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 11111 U.S. 487, 61 Sup. Ct. 1020, 
85 L. Ed. 1477 (1941); Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1940), cert. 
denied, 1110 U.S. 650 (1940). 
IS See note 5 supra. 
aSee Hart Be Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 697·699 
(19511). 
Iii 222 F. Supp. 805, 808·809 (D. Mass. 19611). In so ruling the court specifically 
declined to follow the contrary doctrine enunciated in Rogers v. American Can 
Co., !I05 F.2d 297 (lid Cir. 1962), holding that the derivative right of a stockholder 
to present his corporation's claim of damage for injuries caused by violation of the 
federal antitrust law. was a right determined by federal law and could not be cut 
off by an honest vote of a majority of the stockholders. 
7
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established by the statute. But the Investment Company Act of 1940 
did not provide for such a direct right of action.16 
The choice of law problem in this mixed federal-state question 
area remains a difficult one, but the court's solution in the present 
case seems proper. Inasmuch as the plaintiff-executor sought to 
press, derivatively, the Massachusetts corporation's claim and not 
his own direct right, the district court was correct to hold him to 
the demand requirement prescribed by Massachusetts law.17 
§9.3. Construction of a will of movables: Law of testator's domi-
cile at time of death governs. In Moore v. Cannon1 the Supreme 
Judicial Court applied the usual conflict of laws rule that a will of 
interests in movables is construed in accordance with the law of 
the state in which the testator was domiciled at the time of his 
death.2 
The testator executed his will in 1925 while domiciled in New 
York. He thereafter moved to Massachusetts where he died in 
1926. When the testator made his will, and at his death, personalty 
constituted the bulk of his estate. 
By his will the testator gave the residue of his estate in trust to 
pay the income to his wife during her life; at the death of his wife 
there was to be set up a trust for each then-surviving child of the 
testator. The whole corpus of each trust was to have been paid to 
the child by the time he had reached age thirty. Paragraph seven 
of the will, which was directly involved in the principal issue in the 
case, read as follows: . 
In the event of the death of any of my ... children prior to the 
death of my ... wife, leaving a wife or husband or issue of him 
or her surviving, and surviving my said wife, I hereby direct 
my . . . trustee upon the death of my . . . wife to . . . pay over 
the part of my estate which would have gone to such child ... 
had he or she survived my ... wife and lived to the age of thirty 
years, to those who would have been entitled to receive such 
16 222 F. Supp. S05, S09, S12 (D. Mass. 1963). 
17 Since this analysis was written, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit has vacated the judgment of the federal district court and remanded 
the case to that court with directions. Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d S15 (1st Cir. 
1964), cert. denied, S5 Sup. Ct. 649 (1965). The court of appeals, holding that the 
judgment of the district court "negates the intendment of the [federal Investment 
Company Act] and underestimates the role to be played by the federal courts in 
the implementation of national regulatory legislation," ruled that federal rather 
than state law controlled the minority stockholder's derivative suit under the 
federal statute. The writer is not convinced that the federal issue was the principal 
interest in question. More definite criteria are needed to resolve the choice of 
law problem in this federal-state interest area. 
§9.3. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 929, 199 N.E.2d 312, also noted in §4.2 supra. 
2 Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second §§306, 30S (Tent. Draft No.5, 1959); 
Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 332-337 (4th ed., Scoles, 1964); Lefiar, Conflict of Laws 
361-364 (1959); Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 3S0-3S6 (3d ed. 1963). 
8
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part of my ... estate had such child died intestate vested with 
the title thereto.s 
At the death of the testator's widow in 1961, the trustees under 
the will sought declaratory relief concerning the distribution of 
the trust corpus. Specifically, the case was concerned with the dis-
tribution of the share which Donald, a son of the testator, would 
have taken if he had been alive at the death of the testator's widow. 
Donald died in 1943, leaving his wife and an adopted son, John, 
both of whom were still living. The primary issue was whether John, 
adopted in Massachusetts by Donald in 1938, more than twelve years 
after the testator's death in 1926, could share in the trust corpus 
by virtue of the provisions of paragraph seven, already quoted. The 
case was reported to the Supreme Judicial Court by the probate judge 
without decision. 
Since the testator had not designated a law to govern the con-
struction of his will, the Court ruled that the will was to be construed 
in accordance with the law of Massachusetts where the testator had 
been domiciled at the time of his death. The Court thus applied 
the usual choice of law principle pertinent to the interpretation of 
a will of movable property' and the one endorsed by Massachusetts 
usage.1i 
The Court then turned to the interpretation of paragraph seven 
of the will and held that it referred to the statute governing the 
intestate distribution of Donald's estate. Since Donald died domiciled 
in Massachusetts, conflicts law dictated that questions of intestate 
succession to his personal property were to be determined by the 
law of Massachusetts.s The statutes referred to, therefore, were the 
Massachusetts statutes relating to intestacy.7 
The Court, having disposed of this conflict of laws problem, 
resumed the interpretation of paragraph seven under apposite Massa-
chusetts law to determine what rights, if any, the adopted son John 
had in the trust corpus. 
Prior to 1958, an adopted child's rights under a will were severely 
restricted if the testator were not the adopting parent.8 Consequently, 
S 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 929, 930, 199 N.E.2d 312, 313. 
'See note 2 supra. 
Ii See Second Bank·State Street Trust Co. v. Weston, 342 Mass. 630, 635·636, 174 
N.E.2d 763, 767 (1961). 
6 See Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second §303 (Tent. Draft No.5, 1959); 
Leflar, Conflict of Laws 354·356 (1959). 
7 See G.L., c. 190, §§1-3; id., c. 210, §7. 
8 G.L., c. 210, §8, formerly read: "The word 'child,' or its equivalent, in a .•. 
bequest shall include a child adpoted by the ... testator, unless the contrary 
plainly appears by the terms of the instrument; but if the ... testator is not him-
self the adopting parent, the child by adoption shall not have, under such instru-
ment, the rights of a child born in lawful wedlock to the adopting parent, unless 
it plainly appears to have been the intention of the . . . testator to include an 
adopted child." Section 8 has been amended by Acts of 1958, c. 121, §l, to read: 
"The word 'child,' or its equivalent, in a . . . bequest shall include an adopted 
9
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if the words "issue" and "heirs," found in other provlSlons of the 
testator's will, had occurred in the dispositive part of paragraph 
seven, it could reasonably have been argued, on the basis of the 
pre-1958 form of General Laws, Chapter 210, Section 8, that John 
could not share in the part of the trust corpus which Donald would 
have taken if he had survived his mother. 
The testator, however, used different words to designate the 
ultimate recipients of that part of the trust corpus, viz., "to those 
who would have been entitled to receive such part of my ... estate 
had such child died intestate vested with the title thereto." This 
language, the Court stated, indicated the testator's intention that 
Donald's share of the trust property was to be dealt with essentially 
as Donald's own property, which the testator should have realized 
might pass to later adopted children of Donald. The Court held, 
therefore, as a matter of interpretation of the testamentary language, 
that the same persons, including the adopted son John, took Donald's 
share of the corpus who would have taken Donald's own property 
by intestacy. 
The Court stated that no Massachusetts case that had been brought 
to its attention dealt with precisely this question. Case law abun-
dantly substantiated the construction of the pre-1958 form of General 
Laws, Chapter 210, Section 8, as excluding an adopted child when 
a person not the adoptive parent used the words "issue," "heirs," and 
"children" in the dispositive language of the will.9 The Court 
refused, however, to extend those decisions to the present case, in 
which the testator in effect treated his deceased son Donald's share, 
for the purposes of distribution, as if legal title had been vested in 
Donald. The Court thereupon ordered a decree to be entered in 
the probate court declaring, inter alia, that John should take two 
thirds of the share of the trust corpus which would have been 
Donald's had he survived the testator's widow. 
It is obviously desirable that so far as possible an estate should 
be treated as a unit and, to this end, that its different components 
should be controlled by a single law. For this reason the common 
law of conflicts refers questions relating to the validity, effect, and 
construction of a will of movables to the law of the testator's domicile 
at his death. The application of traditional choice-of-Iaw doctrine 
by the Court in the present case was justified because the various 
elements in the case clearly called for Massachusetts law in the 
interests of uniformity and convenience. 
The Court's refusal to extend the disabling rule relating to an 
adopted child was also warranted. Present trends favor treating 
child to the same extent as if born to the adopting parent or parents in lawful 
wedlock unless the contrary plainly appears by the terms of the instrument." The 
1958 Act (by §2) made the amendment applicable only to "grants ... or bequests 
executed after the effective date of" that act. 
o See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Wood, 321 Mass. 519, 523-524, 74 N.E.2d 
HI, 144 (1947). 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1964 [1964], Art. 12
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1964/iss1/12
90 1964 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETrS LAW §9.4 
adopted children equally with the natural children of parents. The 
1958 amendment of General Laws, Chapter 210, Section 8,10 attests 
to the presence of that trend in Massachusetts. The Court's decision, 
therefore, was in accord with present Massachusetts public policy. 
§9.4. Life insurance contract: Effect of material misrepresenta-
tions in application. In Merchants National Bank of Newburyport 
v. New York Life Insurance CO.,1 the Supreme Judicial Court was 
presented with the question of what state's law should govern the 
rights created by a life insurance contract. Specifically, the issue 
presented was what law controls as to whether a false statement made 
by the insured in his application to the company bars recovery 
upon the policy. 
The insurance company (New York), through a California office, 
issued to a domiciliary of California an insurance policy on his life. 
The policy was assigned to the plaintiff bank in California. The 
insured died eight months after the issuance of the policy. In his 
application the insured had stated that he had never used alcoholic 
beverages to excess or been treated for alcoholism. An investigation 
by the defendant, New York, disclosed that the insured's representa-
tions were anything but true. It consequently notified the plaintiff 
that because of the misrepresentations the policy was voidable, that 
it had elected to rescind, and that therefore it denied liability. The 
bank thereupon brought action to recover the face amount of the 
policy. 
In answer to a demand for the admission of facts under General 
Laws, Chapter 21H, Section 69, the plaintiff admitted the insured's 
misrepresentations with reference to the use of alcohol. At the 
close of the evidence the trial judge directed a verdict for New York 
to which the bank excepted. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that under the law of Massa-
chusetts, as under the law of California, the trial court correctly 
directed a verdict for New York and overruled the plaintiff's excep-
tions. Under Massachusetts law the misrepresentations concerning 
the use of alcohol materially increased the risk, as a matter of law, 
and entitled New York to avoid the policy.2 The Court, noting 
that the insured had his domicile in California, and that the in-
surance contract seemed to have been made in that state, also con-
sidered the law of California. An analysis of apposite California 
law revealed that the same result would have been reached under 
that law. 
Although the events in the present case occurred in California, 
and the suit was brought in Massachusetts, there was no choice of 
10 See note 8 supra. 
§9.4. 1546 Mass. 745, 196 N.E.2d 201 (1964). 
2 See G.L., c. 175, §186; Lennon v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 559 Mass. 
57, 59-40, 157 N.E.2d 518, 519-520 (1959); Rainger v. Boston Mutual Life Assn., 
167 Mass. 109, lll, 44 N.E. 1088, 1089 (1896). 
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law problem. Since the outcome was the same whether Massachusetts 
or California law was applied, the Court did not have to decide 
between its own law and the law of California to determine the 
rights of the parties. The Court's opinion, however, is not without 
significance with regard to the proper choice of law rule relating to 
the rights created by life insurance contracts. 
The substantial weight of authority is that the validity, interpreta-
tion, and effect of a life insurance contract are governed by the law 
of the place where it is made.8 This position represents a particular 
application of the traditional lex loci contractus rule. The Court 
took cognizance of traditional doctrine, therefore, when it decided 
to consider the law of California "because the contract seems to have 
been made there.'" But the Court also noted, with a reference to 
Section 346h of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second, that 
the insured had his domicile in California. The inference seems to 
be that the Court is not irrevocably committed to the traditional 
place-of-making rule and would give full consideration to the law 
of the state which had significant contacts with the contract.1 
Inasmuch as the chief purpose of insurance legislation is to pro-
tect the insured individual against the company, the law of the state 
with the greatest interest in the insured should be applied to 
determine the rights of the parties. It is submitted that the me-
chanical application of the lex loci contractus does not achieve this 
objective.6 
§9.5. Interspousal immunity: Domiciliary law controls. As this 
writer had occasion to note at some length in the 1963 SURVEY, the 
traditional rules for choice of law in tort cases are under attack.1 
As a consequence, the traditional place-of-impact rule is gradually 
giving way to the view that the substantive law of the state which 
has significant contacts with the transaction determines whether there 
is a cause of action sounding in tort. The decision of the Supreme 
Court of New Hampshire in Thompson v. Thompson2 attests to this 
development. 
S See Leflar, Conflict of Laws 249·250 (1959). 
'See Davis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 212 Mass. 1110, 312, 98 N.E. 1043, 1044 
(1912). 
I Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second §346h (Tent. Draft No.6, 1960), reads 
in part as follows: "(I) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the validity of a life 
insurance contract and the rights created thereby are determined •.. by the local 
law of the state where the insured was domiciled at the time the policy was 
issued. (2) If the contacts which 'the contract has with another state are sufficient 
to establish a more significant relationship between the contract and the other 
state, the local law of the other state will govern." 
6 Although ,the courts usually purport to apply the law of the place of making 
to determine the rights created by life insurance contracts, it seems that in the 
great majority of decisions this place has coincided with the insured's domicile at 
the time of his receipt of the policy. See id. Reporter's Note at 117. 
§9.5. 1 See 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §8.1. 
2105 N. H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963). 
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In Thompson a wife brought action against her husband in the 
New Hampshire court to recover for injuries allegedly caused by 
the gross negligence of her husband while operating, in Massachusetts, 
a motor vehicle in which she was a passenger. Both wife and 
husband were domiciled in New Hampshire. The defendant hus-
band moved to dismiss the action on the ground that one spouse 
cannot maintain a tort action against the other under Massachusetts 
law. The trial court granted the defendant's motion, and the 
plaintiff wife took exception. The Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire, holding that the question of interspousal immunity is governed 
by the law of New Hampshire, the domiciliary law, and that under 
that law such immunity does not exist, sustained the plaintiff's 
exception and remanded the case. 
Before the Thompson decision it was well-settled law in New 
Hampshire that although a wife could bring a tort action against her 
husband for acts of negligence committed in New Hampshire, her 
right to recover against him for such acts done in another state was 
determined by the law of the second state.s Since, under the law of 
Massachusetts, the place of the allegedly negligent act, no cause of 
action arises in favor of husband or wife for a tort committed there 
by the other during coverture,4 the ruling of the trial court in granting 
the defendant's motion to dismiss was, as the Supreme Court pointed 
out, clearly in accordance with then existing New Hampshire law. 
This deference shown to the lex loci delicti by New Hampshire law 
in the matter of interspousal tort suits was in accord with the tradi-
tional vested rights doctrine.1i Recent decisions from several juris-
dictions, however, support the view that interspousal immunity is to 
be determined more logically according to the law of the domicile of 
the parties.6 The New Hampshire Supreme Court, taking note of 
the recent trend, stated that "the time has come to re-examine the 
position taken by our cases." 
The reasons generally advanced to explain the existence of the 
prohibition against interspousal suits are the preservation of marital 
harmony and the avoidance of collusive suits. Whatever the correct 
explanation, it is clear that the state of the parties' domicile has the 
greatest interest in the matter. The question of immunity from suit 
must, therefore, be determined by the law of the family domicile.7 
The court, noting that New Hampshire law permits interspousal 
suits without fear of collusion or of family discord within its borders, 
S See Gray v. Gray, 87 N.H. 82, 174 Atl. 508 (19M). 
4 G.L.; c. 209, §6; Callow v. Thomas, 822 Mass. 550, 78 N.E.2d 687 (1948). 
5 See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 168-169 (4th ed., Scoles, 1964); Stumberg, Con-
flict of Laws 205·207 (lid ed. 1963). 
6 See, e.g., Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Koplik v. C. P. 
Trucking Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 84 (1958); Haumschild v. Continental Gas 
Co., 7 Wis. 2d 180, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959). See also Restatement of Conflict of 
Laws Second §390g (Tent. Draft No.9, 1964). 
7 See Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second §890g, Comment a (Tent. Draft 
No.9, 1964); Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 581·588 (1962). 
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stated that a suit between New Hampshire spouses could hardly be 
the concern of Massachusetts. Accordingly, the court held that the 
question of whether the defendant was immune from liability to his 
wife was governed by New Hampshire law, the law of the parties' 
domicile, and it specifically overruled the Gray case and all subsequent 
decisions that applied the lex loci delicti principle. 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court properly rejected the lex loci 
delicti rule in Thompson. The question of the interspousal suit was 
clearly an incident of the marital status centered in New Hampshire. 
It makes no sense to have that incident governed by Massachusetts 
law merely because the husband and wife happened to be involved in 
an accident there. 
It should be noted that the court, in dictum, chose to apply Massa-
chusetts law with its gross negligence standardS to judge the defendant 
husband's conduct toward his wife-passenger. The court gave no 
reason for this choice beyond stating that "we have no doubt that the 
law of the jurisdiction where a tort is committed should continue to 
determine the applicable standard of care." 
One might question whether the standard of care applicable to the 
conduct of New Hampshire spouses is of less concern to that state and 
its law than the matter of interspousal immunity. The court held 
that New Hampshire law governed the latter issue because New 
Hampshire was the state with the more significant contacts with the 
transaction. It can reasonably be argued on the same basis that New 
Hampshire law should control the question of the standard of care.9 
It seems safe to predict that this dictum of the court in Thompson 
will not become ruling law in New Hampshire as long as the court 
has to determine the applicable standard of care in the context of 
important contracts centered in that state. 
SSee Falden v. Crook. 342 Mass. 173. 175. 172 N.E.2d 686,688 (1961); Massaletti 
v. Fitzroy. 228 Mass. 487. 118 N.E. 168 (1917). 
9 See Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second §§379. 379a. 380 (Tent. Draft No. 
9. 1964). 
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